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Abstract 
This study empirically examines what makes Ukrainian family-firm culture unique 
by comparing the values and beliefs of Ukrainian family-business members with 
that  of  professional  bank  managers  within  Ukraine.  Morck  and  Yeung  (2003) 
suggest that the implications of family business are especially relevant for former 
planned  economies  such  as  Ukraine  in  that  government’s  social  policy  on  the 
encouragement or discouragement of privately-held sectors of the economy is yet 
to be fully formed.  Ukraine’s future course in this regard is particularly sensitive as 
the pre-Soviet Ukrainian economy was almost entirely held in private hands while 
the Soviet-era economy was almost entirely state-controlled. Family-firm literature 
stresses the differences between family-firm and professional management in terms 
of culture, goal-setting, and strategy. Family-firm culture is said to be a resource 
leading to competitive advantage. This study is based on a survey comparing 76 
family-firm  members  and  99  professional  managers.  Statistically  significant 
differences between the culture of members of family-owned firms and professional 
managers were found within Ukraine. Family-firm membership had a significant 
effect  in  five  culture  constructs.    We  can  conclude  that  differences  in  Power 
Distance, Social Cynicism, Social Flexibility, Spirituality and Fate Control describe 
fundamental  aspects  of  family-firms  in  Ukraine  and  may  possibly  contribute  to 
family-firm competitive advantage as discussed in management literature.   
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1. Introduction 
This  study  empirically  creates  a  cultural  profile  of  post-Soviet  Ukrainian  family-
firms.  Family-firm  literature  has  in  the  past  strongly  suggested  that  family-firm 
culture has a major effect on goal-sets (Sharma, Chrisman & Chua 1997), strategy 
(Davis 1984; Dyer 1994; Sharma, Chrisman & Chua 1997; Hall, Melin & Nordqvist, 
2001), and performance (Dyer 1986; Ram & Holliday 1993; Whyte 1996). However, 
little  has  been  done  to  empirically  delineate  what  that  culture  might  actually 
consist  of.  Without  attempting  to  tie  specific  cultural  values  or  beliefs  to 
performance  outcomes,  this  study  uses  seven  cultural  constructs  from  the 
literature to develop a profile of Ukrainian family firms and to distinguish this from 
a profile of Ukrainian non-family management. 
Family-owned  firms dominate most of the  world’s  economies, and are a major 
source of entrepreneurship, but are under-researched, especially in a cross-cultural 
way.  Entrepreneurship  is  a  major  driver  of  developing  economies  although  a 
developing economy’s culture may be an inhibitor (Todorovic and McNaughton, 
2007) and thus Ukraine is an especially appropriate country to study in this regard. 
The  implications  of  family  business  are  especially  relevant  for  former  planned 
economies  such  as  Ukraine  in  that  government’s  social  policy  on  the 
encouragement or discouragement of privately-held sectors of the economy is yet 
to be fully formed (Morck & Yeung, 2003).   
It is commonly assumed that firms are managed to maximize the returns of owners 
(Varian  1978),  but  managers  may  maximize  their  self-interest  in  the  same  way 
owners do, making decisions that further their own interests but do not promote 
the interests of shareholders (Berle & Means 1932). Strategies and structures that 
maximize ownership value will more likely be found in companies that have a large 
amount  of  ownership  control  than  in  companies  without  (McEachern  1975). 
Family-owned businesses should be the strongest examples of these.  
The family organization is unequaled in the transfer of culture between generations 
(Gersick et al 1997). In a family firm, the family’s values become the company’s 
cultural values. An inimitable culture can be a resource which leads to sustained 
competitive advantage (Barney 1986). If cultural values that are valuable to success 
are  embedded  in  a  family  organization  then  this  may  lead  to  a  competitive 
advantage. 
Although observable cultural attributes of family firms have been described and 
compared with non-family firm culture, only a small amount of quantifiable cultural 
comparisons has been presented. Hall, Melin, and Nordqvist (2001) conclude that 
similarities and differences in cultural characteristics between family firms in dif-
ferent countries should be researched using cross-cultural comparative studies of 
family businesses. Tsui, Nifadkar, and Ou (2007) urge a polycontextual approach The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine  
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that  recognizes  within-nation  cultural  variations  including  the  effects  of 
professional culture variations. Professional culture may override the influence of 
national culture (Parboteeah et al., 2005). This study begins to bridge this gap by 
empirically  and  quantifiably  showing  evidence  of  value  and  belief  cultural 
attributes  of  family-owned  firms  which  differentiate  them  from  non-family 
businesses. 
2. Competitive Advantage of Family Business 
Despite  all  disadvantages,  family  firms  have  so  often  been  so  successful  that 
kinship must supply major benefits (Goody 1996). Although disadvantages have 
been found, much family business research indicates family organizations having 
large  competitive  advantages  (Brokaw,1992).  Aronoff  and  Ward,  (1995),  among 
others,  argue  that  the  family  firm  is  a  superior  model  for  success.  Daily  and 
Dollinger’s (1992) research also found that family control resulted in performance 
advantages.  
Family  firms  may  have  an  organizational-culture-based  competitive  advantage. 
Barney (1986) holds that a source of sustained competitive advantage can arise 
from  an  inimitable  culture.  Thus,  if  values  that  are  valuable  to  success  are 
embedded  into  the  family,  the  family  organization  may  have  a  competitive 
advantage.  There  are  two  important  factors  that  drive  behavior  in  family 
organizations: familial goals and values (Dyer 1986; Tagiuri & Davis 1992; Fukuyama 
1995) which include development and support of family members. Firms, however, 
use  economic  criteria  such  as  profits,  market  share,  and  efficiency  to  measure 
performance. Family firm research indicates that family goals and needs often drive 
decisions regarding plant location, financial strategy, and business strategy (Ward 
1988; Kahn & Henderson 1992; Mishra & McConaughy 1999).  
Ward (1988) finds that family businesses encourage family-oriented environments 
and  inspire  strong  employee  loyalty.  Family-firms  tend  to  bring  out  better 
performance in their employees (Moscetello 1990), and are seen to have greater 
trustworthiness (Ward & Aronoff 1991; Tagiuri & Davis 1996). Family values take 
precedence over corporate values; family business managers have a reputation for 
integrity and their reputation with suppliers and customers is stronger than those 
of  non-family  firms  (Lyman  1991).  In  a  family  firm,  family  values  become 
organizational cultural values. A family business’s culture is the product of beliefs, 
values, and goals embedded in its history and social ties (Hall, Melin & Nordqvist, 
2001).  The  generational  transfer  of  beliefs  and  values  creates  a  stable  family 
culture and family business.  
Johnson (1986) and Schoenenberger (1997) state that firm strategy has its origins 
in firm culture. Family goals and family-firm business strategies tend to be closely 
aligned, allowing commitment to a more successful long-run strategy (Aronoff & William D. BRICE & Wayne D. JONES 
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Ward 1994). Kets de Vries (1996) found that family-firm founders exhibit stronger 
requirements for control. Founders are less likely to delegate power, and family 
firms tend to be centralized and controlled by the founder's beliefs (Kets de Vries 
1996). Coffee and Scase (1985); Hall (1988); Tagiuri and Davis (1996); Poza, Alfred, 
and Maheshwari (1997) also find that decision-making is centered with the top 
family  members  in  family-firms.  Family  businesses  thus  foster  closer  alignment 
between  organizational  culture  and  strategy  and  greater  commitment  to  the 
strategy.  Davis (1984) emphasizes the importance of culture to strategy by arguing 
that strategy arises from guiding beliefs which are why the organization wants to 
accomplish the strategy. Internalization of these beliefs by firm members leads to 
higher performance (Dyer 1986).  
Family organizations respond faster to environmental changes (Dreux 1990), are 
less  environmentally  dependent,  and  are  thus  less  vulnerable  to  economic 
reversals  (Donckels  &  Frohlich  1991).  Family  businesses  react  less  to  economic 
cycles because they have a long-term vision (Ward 1997). Family firms use a short-
term planning horizon in response to uncertain environments and very long time 
horizons  in  stable  environments  (Bruun  1993;  Whyte  1996;  Perez-Lizaur  1997). 
Family  firm  members  are  easier  to  coordinate  and  are  more  adaptable  when 
conditions change because of their tacit knowledge of each other and of the firm 
(Benedict 1968; Greenhalgh 1989; Ram & Holiday 1993). 
The literature shows that the competitive advantage of family firms are based on 
their  organization’s  inimitable  family-based  culture.  Specific  and  distinctive 
qualities of family firms include goals that support family members and values of 
altruism. This culture leads to a family-oriented environment, stronger employee 
loyalty,  greater  reputation  for  integrity  and  ethical  behavior,  closer  alignment 
between  organizational  culture  and  strategy,  faster  response  to  environmental 
shifts, and a longer term viewpoint that is less reactive to economic cycles. Family 
firms also tend to coordinate family members in the firms better than non-family 
firms do their executives and staff.  
3. Metrics of Family Business Culture 
The literature identifies a wide range of culture-based behaviors which may be 
different for family firms and which may provide some competitive advantage to 
the family firm. But before culture’s impact on the strategy and performance of 
family firms can be examined, there must be some way of establishing cultural 
benchmark  measures  for  both  family  and  non-family  firms.  Another  body  of 
literature, which of cultural constructs, has developed measures of culture.  These 
measures have mainly been used to compare culture at the level of the nation, but 
some can be used at the organizational level to compare family and non-family 
firms. The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine  
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Geert  Hofstede  (1980  1991,  &  2001)  has  shown  that  his  instrument  items  for 
Power Distance and Masculinity-Femininity are suitable to measure the cultures of 
occupational groups and not just entire nations. Hofstede states that social classes, 
which are closely linked with occupation, carry different class cultures (Hofstede 
1991). His findings showed that Power Distance measurements varied significantly 
by occupation, both across national cultures and within national cultures. Hofstede 
defined Power Distance as the “extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions  and  organizations  within  a  society  expect  and  accept  that  power  is 
distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2001) and is related to the degree of autocratic 
leadership  that  is  preferred.  Masculinity/Femininity  scores    should  be  lower  in 
cultures that have more tender values with a greater concern with quality of life 
and other welfare issues (Hofstede, 2001).  
Leung, Bond et al. (2002) have empirically shown that beliefs correlate more closely 
to  managerial  behavior  than  do  surveyed  values  or  attitudes.  Their  five 
measurements of social axioms are designed for the personal level rather than the 
national level (Bond, 2004) and can be used to differentiate both national culture 
and  sub-national  groupings.  Social  Cynicism  is  the  belief  that  manipulation  is 
effective  in  getting  ahead  of  others  (Leung  and  Bond  2004).  Social  Flexibility 
measures the contradictory nature of social behavior, a belief in the lack of rigid 
rules, and the existence of multiple solutions to a problem (Leung and Bond 2004). 
Reward for Application is the degree of belief that trying hard and being persistent 
will  pay-off  (Leung  and  Bond  2004).  Spirituality  is  the  degree  of  belief  in  the 
supernatural or religious factors of existence (Leung and Bond 2004). Fate Control 
is the degree of belief in whether events can be controlled (Leung and Bond 2004).  
In this study, we view family businesses as a subgroup with hypothesized cultural 
attributes distinct from non-family businesses. In this way, we see family business 
owner-managers as a kind of occupational grouping. We then use both Hofstede’s 
and Bond’s measures to look for significant differences between family and non-
family  firms  that  may  make  family  firms  distinctive.  Identifying  such  distinctive 
cultural  attributes  could  be  the  first  step  in  understanding  the  hypothesized 
culture-based advantages of family firms. 
4. Hypotheses 
Every culture includes a range of values and beliefs which can be measured via 
survey questionnaires. This study used cultural measures to look at family-business 
culture across nations and in comparison with non-family management culture of 
the  same  nation.  Cultural  measures  have  been  shown  to  differ  significantly 
between some occupations as well as between national cultures (Hofstede 1980 & 
2001).  Family-business  owners  and  managers  may  be  seen  as  both  classes  and 
occupational  categories.  We  thus  expect  that  the  values/beliefs  that  drive  the William D. BRICE & Wayne D. JONES 
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family business may diverge significantly not only from those of family firms in 
other nations, but also from the average values/beliefs of professional managerial 
culture in the same nation.  
Our hypotheses address the specific differences we expect to find on our culture 
measures between family and non-family firms in Ukraine. Kets de Vries (1993), 
Dyer  (1994);  along  with  Gersick  et  al  (1997)  label  family  firms  as  often  being 
inward-looking, traditional, unyielding, and difficult to change. Kets de Vries (1996) 
states that two common characteristics of family-firm founders are mistrust and a 
requirement for control. Founders usually do not like to delegate power, and their 
firms are usually centralized and controlled by the founder's beliefs (Kets de Vries 
1996). Coffee and Scase (1985); Hall (1988); Tagiuri and Davis (1996); Poza, Alfred, 
and Maheshwari (1997) also find that decision-making is centered with the top 
family members in family-firms. These descriptions suggest that family firms may 
score high in the Power Distance dimension. Hofstede (1991) states that his Power 
Distance measurement will be lower in groups with higher education, class, and 
occupational  status.  Thus  professionally  trained  managers  may  have  relatively 
lower scores in this dimension. 
H1: Mean Power Distance scores for Ukrainian family-firm members will be higher 
than the mean scores for professional managers of non-family Ukrainian firms. 
It should be noted that the above references to founders’ rigidity, mistrust, and 
control seem to contradict the earlier references to the stronger culture of trust 
and loyalty found in family firms. Thus, it seems possible that the results could go 
either  way.  We  have  predicted  an  outcome  that  seems  to  align  with  the 
preponderance of the literature.   
The  Masculinity/Femininity  dimension’s  definition  (Hofstede,  2001)  states  that 
groups scoring low on Masculinity (high in Femininity) would be more tender with a 
greater concern with quality of life and other welfare issues. Stewart (2003) states 
that leaders of kinship-based firms may need to display conspicuous generosity 
towards family. Schulze et al. (2001) also say that altruistic values influence family 
businesses and that family altruism makes family-business membership valuable in 
ways that is not usually found in membership with other kinds of firms. Thus it may 
be expected that members of family-firms will be more concerned with welfare and 
quality of life issues than would non-family professionals, and will score higher on 
Feminity or lower on Masculinity. 
H2: Mean Masculinity scores for Ukrainian family-firm members will be lower than 
the mean scores for professional managers of non-family Ukrainian firms. 
Leung and Bond’s (2004) research finds that Social Cynicism relates positively to 
lower life satisfaction, lower satisfaction toward one’s company, a faster pace of 
life (possibly related to a business-like transactional approach to life), a rejection of The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine  
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value-based leadership, and more disagreement with the in-group. On the other 
hand, Dyer (1986); Tagiuri and Davis (1992); and Fukuyama (1995) find that family 
goals  and  values  are  the  factors  driving  family  business  behavior.  Family  firms 
generally have family-oriented workplaces which inspire stronger than usual loyalty 
(Ward 1988). Family relationships generate higher than usual motivation, loyalty, 
and  trust  (Tagiuri  &  Davis  1996).  Family  values  and  personal  relationships  take 
precedence over the usual values found in corporations; and family firm members 
exhibit  high  integrity  and  relationship  commitment  (Lyman  1991).  Thus  it  is 
expected that family-firm members will score relatively low on Social Cynicism. 
H3: Mean Social Cynicism scores for Ukrainian family-firm members will be lower 
than the mean scores for professional managers of non-family Ukrainian firms. 
Leung and Bond’s (2004) research finds that Social Flexibility relates positively with 
a belief in the lack of rigid rules, the existence of multiple solutions to a problem 
and inconsistency in human behavior. Family firm members are more adaptable 
than non-family firms in changeable conditions (Benedict 1968; Greenhalgh 1989; 
Ram  &  Holiday  1993).  Family  firms  are  more  flexible  in  reducing  consumption 
during  economic  downturns  and  expanding  working  hours  during  economic 
upturns  (Blim  1990;  Song  1999).  Family  firms  have  greater  flexibility  than  non-
family firms in using a short-term planning horizon in uncertain environments and 
very long time horizons in stable environments (Bruun 1993; Perez-Lizaur 1997; 
Whyte 1996). Thus it is expected that family firm members will score relatively high 
on Social Flexibility.  
H4: Mean Social Flexibility scores for Ukrainian family-firm members will be higher 
than the mean scores for professional managers of non-family Ukrainian firms. 
Leung  and  Bond’s  (2004)  research  finds  that  Reward  for  Application  relates 
positively to higher reliance on superiors, lower reliance on specialists, as well as a 
lower emphasis on mutual attraction, education and intelligence. It is also related 
to  a  lower  tolerance  for  divorce.  Kets  de  Vries  (1996)  found  that  family-firm 
founders are less likely to delegate power, and family firms tend to be centralized 
and  controlled  by  the  founder's  beliefs  (Kets  de  Vries  1996).  Coffee  and  Scase 
(1985); Hall (1988); Tagiuri and Davis (1996); Poza, Alfred, and Maheshwari (1997) 
also find that decision-making is centered with top family members in family-firms. 
Managerial influence may be based on kinship rather than expertise (Greenhalgh 
1994). Thus it is expected that family firm members will score relatively high on 
Reward for Application. 
H5: Mean Reward for Application scores for Ukrainian family-firm members will be 
higher than the mean scores for professional managers of non-family Ukrainian 
firms. William D. BRICE & Wayne D. JONES 
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Leung and Bond’s (2004) research finds that Spirituality relates positively with a 
stronger endorsement of humane leadership, longer working hours, more frequent 
church attendance and a higher level of agreeableness. Family firm members are 
more committed (Mattessich & Hill 1976), harder working (Benedict 1968; Ram & 
Holliday  1993)  and  longer-serving  than  non-family  members  (Wong  1988;  Song 
1999).  Moscetello  (1990)  finds  that  family  organizations  have  less  managerial 
politics. Adams, Taschian, and Shore (1996) find that a family firm’s leadership is 
more unlikely to impose bureaucratic codes of ethics and is more apt to lead using 
role  modeling.  Lyman  (1991)  states  that  family  values  are  emphasized  over 
corporate  values  and  family-firm  leaders  more  likely  to  exemplify  integrity  and 
commitment to relationships. Thus it is expected that family firm members will 
score relatively high on Spirituality. 
H6: Mean Spirituality scores for Ukrainian family-firm members will be higher than 
the mean scores for professional managers of non-family Ukrainian firms. 
Leung and Bond’s (2004) research finds that Fate Control relates positively to lower 
work ethics, lower endorsement of team-oriented and charismatic leadership, and 
lower satisfaction of life and towards one’s company. These findings are consistent 
with the idea that people high in fate control respond passively to events that 
occur  to  them.  Family  organizations  give  employees  higher  pay  (Donckels  & 
Frohlich 1991), greater work flexibility (Coffee and Scase 1985) and inspire greater 
employee loyalty than non-family firms (Ward 1988). Moscetello (1990) says that 
family firms bring out the best in their employees. Human resource management in 
family organizations is less expensive and more effective (Levering & Moskowitz 
1993). Adams, Taschian, and Shore (1996) find that a family firm’s leadership is 
more likely to use a role modeling type of leadership and Lyman (1991) states that 
family-firm  leaders  are  more  likely  to  exemplify  integrity  and  commitment  to 
relationships. Thus it is expected that family firm members will score relatively low 
on Fate Control. 
H7: Mean Fate Control scores for Ukrainian family-firm members will be lower than 
the mean scores for professional managers of non-family Ukrainian firms. 
5. Methods 
Sample and Instrument 
Small  to  medium-sized  family-owned  firms  were  sampled  in  Ukraine  (a  former 
planned-economy in the process of developing a market economy) and compared 
with samples from professional managers. These firms were predominately retail 
‘brick and mortar’ businesses; none of which were engaged in farming, fishing or 
financial services. Family ownership status was self-reported and firms were in all 
cases  100  percent  family-owned.  Only  family-firm  members  who  participate  in The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine  
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their business were surveyed. Ukrainian Bank managers, who occupy supervisory 
positions, were chosen as proxies for professional management by virtue of being 
professionally trained, both at university and within their corporations. Although 
family firms predominate in most of the world, banking is one of the few industries 
that is professionally managed throughout the world.   
This survey was conducted in the Western Ukrainian city of Ivano-Frankivsk (in a 
region which is overwhelmingly ethnic Ukrainian). All bank branches in the city 
were contacted. 76 family-firm and 99 bank manager surveys were returned with 
response rates of 60 and 70 percent respectively. Instrument items were translated 
to Russian and then back-translated to English to ensure accuracy per Brislin (1970) 
and the instrument was in English for the U.S. sample.  
Hofstede’s  instrument  items  for  Power  Distance  and  Masculinity-Femininity 
(Hofstede  1980  and  1991)  were  taken  from  his  Values  Survey  Module  1994 
Questionnaire (four items each). Leung and Bond’s (2004) five measurements of 
social axioms were used (39 items). Culture items were scored according to a 5-
point Likert scale. 
6. Results 
While this paper only concerns the profile of Ukrainian family firms, the results are 
taken from a larger cross-cultural study. Table 1 gives relevant descriptive statistics 
and  Table  2  shows  correlations  between  constructs  within  each  country.  The 
MANOVA results (see Table 3) suggest that there are effects for national setting, 
for  family/nonfamily,  and  an  interaction  between  business  type  and  national 
setting. This suggests that the pattern of findings for the seven scales depends both 
on individuals’ national settings and their family/nonfamily business status.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  N  Min.  Max.  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation  Skewness 
Std. 
Error  Kurtosis 
Std.  
Error 
Ukraine, Family               
PDI SCORE  75  1.667  4.000  2.809  0.426  0.079  0.277  0.593  0.548 
MAS SCORE  76  1.500  3.250  2.296  0.410  0.218  0.276  -0.931  0.545 
SC SCORE  76  2.158  4.316  3.579  0.469  -0.797  0.276  0.113  0.545 
RA SCORE  76  2.438  4.688  3.888  0.365  -0.619  0.276  2.292  0.545 
SF SCORE  76  2.857  4.429  3.723  0.353  -0.135  0.276  -0.661  0.545 
S SCORE  76  2.417  4.583  3.618  0.481  -0.283  0.276  -0.240  0.545 
FC SCORE  76  1.875  4.625  3.512  0.606  -0.564  0.276  -0.305  0.545 
Ukraine, Bank               
PDI SCORE  99  2.250  4.000  3.030  0.380  0.459  0.243  -0.143  0.481 
MAS SCORE  99  1.250  3.500  2.356  0.431  0.213  0.243  -0.144  0.481 
SC SCORE  99  2.316  4.000  3.268  0.318  -0.021  0.243  -0.218  0.481 
RA SCORE  99  2.688  4.875  3.797  0.388  -0.213  0.243  0.415  0.481 
SF SCORE  99  2.571  3.929  3.420  0.242  -0.473  0.243  1.044  0.481 
S SCORE  99  2.583  4.083  3.282  0.373  0.051  0.243  -0.859  0.481 
FC SCORE  99  1.625  4.375  3.169  0.483  -0.437  0.243  0.927  0.481 
Table 2: Pearson Correlations 
    
PDI  
SCORE 
MAS  
SCORE 
SC  
SCORE 
RA  
SCORE 
SF  
SCORE 
FC 
 SCORE 
S  
SCORE 
Ukraine  PDI SCORE  1.000              
 N=175  MAS SCORE  0.089  1.000           
   SC SCORE  -0.250*  -0.039  1.000         
   RA SCORE  -0.176*  -0.380*  0.100  1.000       
   SF SCORE  -0.244*  -0.091  0.613*  0.230*  1.000     
   FC SCORE  -0.138  -0.269*  0.437*  0.421*  0.425*  1.000   
   S SCORE  -0.262*  -0.126  0.544*  0.332*  0.523*  0.572*  1.000  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
 
Table 3: MANOVA Tests 
Effect 
Multivariate  
Tests(c) 
Value  F  
Hypo.  
df 
Error df  Sig. 
Partial Eta  
Squared 
Noncent.  
Parameter 
Observed  
Power(a) 
Intercept  Pillai's Trace  0.218  12.779  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.218  89.450  1.000 
   Wilks' Lambda  0.782  12.779  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.218  89.450  1.000 
   Hotelling's Trace  0.279  12.779  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.218  89.450  1.000 
  Roy's Largest Root  0.279  12.779  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.218  89.450  1.000 
nation  Pillai's Trace  0.736  127.557  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.736  892.898  1.000 
   Wilks' Lambda  0.264  127.557  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.736  892.898  1.000 
   Hotelling's Trace  2.782  127.557  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.736  892.898  1.000 
   Roy's Largest Root  2.782  127.557  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.736  892.898  1.000 
family  Pillai's Trace  0.348  24.474  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.348  171.317  1.000 
   Wilks' Lambda  0.652  24.474  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.348  171.317  1.000 
   Hotelling's Trace  0.534  24.474  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.348  171.317  1.000 
   Roy's Largest Root  0.534  24.474  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.348  171.317  1.000 
Pillai's Trace  0.237  14.238  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.237  99.666  1.000 
Wilks' Lambda  0.763  14.238  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.237  99.666  1.000 
Hotelling's Trace  0.310  14.238  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.237  99.666  1.000 
nation * 
family 
Roy's Largest Root  0.310  14.238  (b)  7.00  321.0  0.000  0.237  99.666  1.000 
a. Computed using alpha = .05 
b. Exact statistic 
c. Design: Intercept+nation+family+nation * family William D. BRICE & Wayne D. JONES 
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First, the MANOVA results suggest the country samples differ significantly on the 
dependent  variables  (that  is,  the  seven  culture  scales).  Second,  the 
nonfamily/family grouping also differs significantly on the culture scales. Third, 
there are significant interactions present; that is either the family business effect 
is stronger or the nonfamily business effect is stronger in one country across the 
seven  scales.  This  provides  a  simultaneous  test  of  the  relationship  of  an 
individuals’  national  status  and  their  business  status  on  the  seven  cultural 
measures.  While  national  culture  may  be  causing  the  greatest  observed 
differences in the constructs, business type and the interaction of business type 
with national setting also play an important role in explaining responses. 
A discriminant analysis was used to follow-up which of the dependent variables 
are most responsible for the group differences. Overall, 78 percent of individuals 
were correctly classified by the model. Results suggest there are two functions 
that  describe  differences  among  the  groups.  The  first  is  strongly  related  to 
discriminating among national groups and the second is moderately related and 
describes the effect of family/non-family status. Thus, MANOVA and discriminant 
analysis provide support for the construct validity of the measures by showing 
that  national  groups  and  non-family  versus  family  business  groups  differ 
significantly on the set of constructs.It was proposed that the values/beliefs that 
drive the Ukrainian family business would diverge significantly from the average 
values/beliefs of Ukrainian professional non-family management culture. Within 
Ukraine, all constructs  showed significant differences between family-firm and 
non-family management scores except for Masculinity and Reward for Application 
(see Table 4). Thus, the results show support in 5 of 7 cultural constructs within 
Ukraine.  The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine  
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Findings 
Hypothesis’ H1 through H7 predict the direction family-firm scores will differ from 
professional manager scores on each construct across national cultures. Two (of 
five)  significant  results  for  Ukraine  align  with  the  predicted  direction.    The 
significant result for Power Distance was opposite the predicted direction.  We 
noted above the conflicting suggestions from the literature about Power Distance.  
Our results provide support for lower Power Distance in family firms.  Our results 
also provide support for greater Social Cynicism, Social Flexibility, Spirituality and 
Fate Control in Ukrainian family firms.  See Table 5 below for complete results. 
 
Table 4: Family and Bank Score Variations 
Means  
    Family  Bank 
PDI (Power Distance)   2.809*  3.030* 
MAS (Masculinity)  2.296  2.356 
SC (Social Cynicism)  3.579*  3.268* 
SF (Social Flexibility)  3.723*  3.420* 
RA (Reward for Application)  3.888  3.797 
S (Spirituality)   3.618*  3.282* 
FC (Fate Control)   3.512*  3.169* 
* = differences significant at 0.0036 (two-tailed test) William D. BRICE & Wayne D. JONES 
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7. Discussion 
Value  and  belief  cultural  characteristics  in  family  firms  and  professional 
management in Ukraine were empirically researched by this study. Family-firm 
members can be measured as members of a class or occupation. This study’s 
results align with findings in the literature that social classes, which are closely 
linked with occupation, carry different class cultures (Hofstede 1991). 
Until this study, family-business members have not been studied in these terms. 
Family business literature often points to family-firm culture as being different 
than professional management culture, as well as being a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage; however, most studies only focus on observable behavior 
resulting from these differences. The literature has provided little in the way of 
empirical  quantitative  data  to  delineate  exactly  what  the  values  or  beliefs  in 
question might be.  
This study found that the values/beliefs that drive the family business in Ukraine 
diverge significantly from the average values/beliefs of professional managers in 
Ukraine.  The literature already connects family-firms to different goal-sets which 
lead to different strategies. The results of this study allow us to connect specific 
differences in Ukrainian family-firm cultural values and beliefs to those findings. 
These results allow us to begin to profile Ukrainian family business in terms of 
basic  cultural  attributes  might  give  these  family  businesses  a  competitive 
Table 5: Actual Family-Firm Score Variation vs. Predicted Direction*  
 
Predicted Direction of  
Score Variation  
(Family vs. Bank) 
 Actual Direction of  
Score Variation  
(Family vs. Bank) 
H1:   PDI (Power Distance)  Higher  Lower 
H2:   MAS (Masculinity)   Lower  Lower ** 
H3:   SC (Social Cynicism)  Lower  Higher 
H4:   SF (Social Flexibility)  Higher  Higher 
H5:   RA (Reward for Application)  Higher  Higher ** 
H6:   S (Spirituality)  Higher  Higher 
H7:   FC (Fate Control)  Lower  Higher 
*   = family-firm scores as compared to bank scores 
** =  differences between family-firm scores and bank scores not significant The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine  
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advantage.  Differences  between  Ukrainian  family  firm  scores  and  Ukrainian 
professional management scores were significant in five out of seven constructs.  
Power Distance is defined as the “extent to which the less powerful members of 
institutions and organizations within a society expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally” (Hofstede, 2001) and is related to the degree of autocratic 
leadership that is preferred. Family firms in Ukraine scored significantly lower 
than professional Ukrainian managers.  
The results fit well with evidence for Russia reported by Hofstede (2001) which 
indicates that Slavic culture scores high on Power Distance. The literature is mixed 
concerning  the  family  versus  professional  aspect  of  this  construct,  with  some 
studies  indicating that family firms might score higher  on the Power Distance 
dimension  (Kets  de  Vries  1996).  On  the  other  hand,  Hofstede  found  that  the 
Power Distance measurement would be lower in groups with higher education, 
class, or occupational status (Hofstede 1991). Members of family-firms may have 
a special social status and class which in many nations is higher than employees, 
no  matter  how  professional.  Our  results  support  the  idea  that  lower  Power 
Distance could be a family-business competitive advantage. 
Masculinity/Femininity scores should be lower in cultures that have more tender 
values  with  a  greater  concern  with  quality  of  life  and  other  welfare  issues 
(Hofstede, 2001). Masculinity scores for Ukrainian family firms were on the lower 
side of the scale, while the difference between family and non-family scores in 
Ukraine was not significant. Because altruistic values influence family businesses 
it was expected that members of family-firms would be more concerned with 
welfare  and  quality  of  life  issues  (more  Feminine)  than  would  non-family 
professionals.    The  lack  of  significant  results  in  Ukraine  could  be  due  to  the 
national culture being extremely low on the Masculine score (high in Femininity) 
as  a  whole.  Russia  (which  can  be  considered  a  proxy  for  Ukraine)  has  been 
measured to be one of the lowest scoring nations on this construct. It is likely that 
the  values  of  low  Masculinity  (high  femininity)  are  universal  within  Ukraine. 
Further research is needed. 
Social Cynicism is the belief that manipulation is  effective in getting ahead of 
others (Leung and Bond 2004). Family-firm literature leads to the expectation that 
family-firm members would score relatively low on Social Cynicism. Ukraine did William D. BRICE & Wayne D. JONES 
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not align with the literature. Both Ukraine family-firms and bank managers scored 
high on this scale which may reflect the state of Ukrainian society after 70 years 
of  communist  government  and  a  corrupt  bureaucracy  which  still  impacts  all 
business  activity.  Cynicism  towards  business  and  government  runs  deep  in 
Ukraine, where any successful business is regarded with the suspicion of being a 
criminal  enterprise.  Ukraine’s  family  firms  also  scored  even  higher  than  did 
Ukrainian professional managers. Results for this construct may reflect the more 
difficult position small independent businesses have, relative to the safer more 
stable careers professional bank managers’ experience. It is the business owner 
who  may  have  a  more  difficult  time  in  personally  dealing  with  the  pervasive 
corruption at all levels of Ukrainian society.  
Social Flexibility measures the contradictory nature of social behavior, a belief in 
the lack of rigid rules, and the existence of multiple solutions to a problem (Leung 
and Bond 2004). Ukraine measured high on this construct, with Ukrainian family 
firms scoring significantly higher than professional managers. The high Ukrainian 
score may again reflect the nature of generations living under communism and 
corruption. The differences between Ukrainian family and professional scores are 
consistent with the family-firm literature that concerns the superior flexibility and 
survivability of family-firms over non-family firms. Our results suggest that greater 
Social Flexibility is another possible source of family-firm competitive advantage. 
Reward  for  Application  is  the  degree  of  belief  that  trying  hard  and  being 
persistent will pay-off (Leung and Bond 2004). Family firm literature leads to the 
expectation that family firm members will score relatively high on Reward for 
Application  compared  with  professionals.  Ukraine  family  firm  scored  high 
although not significantly higher than those of Ukrainian professionals. Thus this 
construct profiles Ukraine as a nation rather than Ukrainian family firms alone. 
Spirituality  is  the  degree  of  belief  in  the  supernatural  or  religious  factors  of 
existence (Leung and Bond 2004). Ukraine measured high on this construct, with 
Ukrainian  family  firms  scoring  significantly  higher  than  Ukrainian  professional 
managers. The difference between family and professional scores is consistent 
with family-firm literature and it was expected that family firm members would 
score relatively high on Spirituality. The Cultural Foundations of Family Business Management: Evidence from Ukraine  
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Fate Control is the degree of belief in whether events can be controlled (Leung 
and Bond 2004). It was expected that family firm members will score relatively 
low on Fate Control. Ukrainian family firms scored high, and significantly higher 
than  did  Ukrainian  professional  managers.  The  results  indicate  that  Ukrainian 
family firm members respond in a passive way to events and may have a low 
satisfaction towards life in general. Results comparing family with professionals 
indicate that Ukrainian professionals may be more satisfied and secure in their 
positions than are family firm members. Again, as in previous findings, this may 
be related to the current state of Ukrainian society as it emerges from its Soviet 
past.  Whereas  business  ownership  in  the  West  may  be  related  to  financial 
independence and security, in Ukraine a professional position seems to engender 
greater feelings of security.  
8. Conclusion and Implications  
This  study  is  the  first  to  provide  details  of  the  cultural  values  and  beliefs  of 
Ukrainian family firms. Family-businesses may be seen as both a class and an 
occupational  category  and  the  fundamental  value  and  belief  cultural  traits  of 
family-firms  can  be  quantitatively  measured  and  compared.  These  cultural 
measurements illustrate the distinctiveness of family-firms and can inform our 
understanding of the uniqueness of family-firms in  areas such as goal-setting, 
strategy, and competitive advantage.  
That  this  study  can  bring  out  such  fundamental  cultural  differences,  between 
family  and  non-family  management,  is  a  testament  to  the  likelihood  that 
traditional management research into professionally managed, widely-held firms 
may not apply equally to both types of firms. Differences as fundamental as the 
ones found in this study imply a host of other possible differences as well. 
This study is limited by being confined to one country. Further study of family 
business  culture  across  more  countries  will  deepen  our  understanding  of  the 
distinctiveness of family firms both within their home country and in comparison 
with family firms across nations.  It may be possible, with study in a larger number 
of countries, to find universal, or near-universal, attributes of family businesses 
that tend to give this business form its culture-based advantages. 
 William D. BRICE & Wayne D. JONES 
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